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6 BEYOND UNDECIDABLE
PAOLA CATTABRIGA
Abstract. The predicate complementary to the well-known Go¨del’s provabil-
ity predicate is defined. From its recursiveness new consequences concerning
the incompleteness argumentation are drawn and extended to new results of
consistency, completeness and decidability with regard to Peano Arithmetic
and the first order predicate calculus.
Keywords: decision problem, provability predicate, Go¨del numbering.
Introduction
Of all the remarkable logical achievements of the twentieth century perhaps the
most outstanding is the celebrated Go¨del incompleteness argumentation of 1931
[1, 2]. In contrast to Hilbert’s program called for embodying classical mathematics
in a formal system and proving that system consistent by finitary methods [4],
Go¨del paper showed that not even the first step could be carried out fully, any
formal system suitable for the arithmetic of integers was incomplete.
The present article, in the most absolute respect for the extraordinary contribu-
tion given by Go¨del to the logical inquiry, brings Go¨del’s achievement into question
by the definition of the refutability predicate. As it is well-known self-reference plays
a crucial role in Go¨del’s incompleteness argumentation and the methods of achiev-
ing self-referential statements is the so-called “diagonalization”. The refutability
predicate, defined by arithmetization as a number-theoretic statement, gives rise
to new consequences properly regarding Go¨del’s incompleteness argumentation and
the method of diagonalization. This article proposes a revision based on the logical
investigation of the interactive links between provability and refutability predicates.
Originally devised by Go¨del in order to arithmetize metamathematical notions,
Go¨del numbering turns out to be the key of the problem in defining refutability
with the same recursive status as provability. The inquiry comes up with a final
solution for finitary methods and the related decision problem [3].
The paper is organized as follows. Firstly, in the following of this section, we
introduce diagonalization and the famous incompleteness argumentation of Go¨del.
Section 1 presents two new primitive recursive predicates for refutability and the
enucleation of some of their consequences, which represent the first main result
of this paper: Go¨del’s incompleteness argumentation is not a theorem in Peano
Arithmetic. Section 2 shows that any formula of Peano Arithmetic is proved if and
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only if it is not refuted, and extends this result to the accomplishment of consistency
and completeness for Peano Arithmetic and then to the achievement of decidability
for first order predicate calculus.
Basic Setup. We shall assume a first order theory which adequately formalizes
Peano Arithmetic (see for example the system S, with all the necessary assumptions,
in [5] 116-175). Let us call it PA. As is well known by means of the Go¨del numbering,
each expression in PA can refer to itself. Numerals, as usual, are defined recursively,
0 is 0 and for any natural number n, n+ 1 is (n)′ (where ′ is the Successor function).
For any expression X we use pXq to denote the corresponding Go¨del number of X .
Let us define the Go¨del numbering as follows:
(1) First assign different odd numbers to the primitive symbols of the language
of PA.
(2) Let X be a formal expression X0, X1, . . . , Xn, where each Xi, 0 6 i 6 n, is
a primitive symbol of the language of PA. Then
pXq = ppX0q0  p
pX1q
1  . . .  p
pXnq
n
where pn is the n-th prime number and p0 = 2.
(3) Let X be composed by the formal expressions X0, X1, . . . , Xn, then
pXq = ppX0q0  . . .  p
pXnq
n .
For any given formula φ(v) of PA we then have its Go¨del number n = pφ(v)q.
This number n has a name in the language of PA, namely n, and this name can
be substituted back into φ(v). This self-reference procedure is admitted by the
so-called diagonalization lemma as follows.
Diagonalization. For any formula φ with only the variable v free there is a sen-
tence δ such that
⊢PA δ ⇐⇒ φ(pδq).
The argumentation usually considered to be a proof is the following. We define the
function of substitution sb(pφ(v)q, n) = pφ(n)q, which gives us the Go¨del number
of the result of replacing v by the n-th numeral in φ(v) (see the corresponding
Sb(xvy) and Sb[x
a
χ(y)] in [1, 2]).
Let φ(v) be given and let us call β(v) the formula φ(sb(v, v)). Let m = pβ(v)q
and δ = β(m). We shall show that δ is the sentence we were looking for. To this
purpose we notice that in PA they hold the following equivalences
⊢ δ ⇐⇒ β(m) by definition
⇐⇒ φ(sb(m,m)) by definition
⇐⇒ φ(sb(pβ(v)q,m)) since m = pβ(v)q
⇐⇒ φ(pβ(m)q) definition of sb
⇐⇒ φ(pδq) by definition.
Go¨del’s Incompleteness. We present the version of the so-called Go¨del’s first
incompleteness Theorem as it is given in ([5] 161-162), to which the reader can
refers for the definition of the concepts which are involved.
Let φ(v) be the formula ∀x¬Pf(x, v), hence by diagonalization lemma we attain
⊢PA δ ⇐⇒ ∀x¬Pf(x, pδq).
Go¨del’s incompleteness argumentation asserts:
(a) if PA is consistent, not ⊢PA δ,
(b) if PA is ω-consistent, not ⊢PA ¬δ,
hence, if PA is ω-consistent, δ is an undecidable sentence of PA.
The proof is as follows. Let q be the Go¨del number of δ.
(a) Assume ⊢PA δ. Let r be the Go¨del number of a proof in PA of δ. Then
Pf(r, q). Hence, ⊢PA Pf(r, q), that is ⊢PA Pf(r, pδq). We already have
⊢PA δ ⇐⇒ ∀x¬Pf(x, pδq). By Biconditional Elimination, ⊢PA ∀x¬Pf(x, pδq).
By Rule A4 (Particularization Rule), ⊢PA ¬Pf(r, pδq). Therefore, PA is
inconsistent.
(b) Assume PA is ω-consistent and ⊢PA ¬δ. Since ⊢PA δ ⇐⇒ ∀x¬Pf(x, pδq),
Biconditional Elimination yields ⊢PA ¬∀x¬Pf(x, pδq) which abbreviates
to (∗) ⊢PA ∃xPf(x, pδq). On the other hand, since PA is ω-consistent, PA
is consistent. But, ⊢PA ¬δ. Hence, not ⊢PA δ; that is, there is no proof
in PA of δ. So Pf(n, q) is false for every natural number n and, therefore,
⊢PA ¬Pf(n, pδq) for every natural number n.(Remember that pδq is q.)
By ω-consistency, not ⊢PA ∃xPf(x, pδq), contradicting (∗).
1. Refutability
We are now ready to present the results with which this paper is concerned. We
shall construct two new predicates by Go¨del numbering. The reader can refer to the
arithmetization as defined by Mendelson; the new predicates must be considered
as two last relations added to the functions and relations (1-26) presented in ([5]
149-156)1. Let us start recalling some of the definitions involved, precisely only
those we need.
MP(x, y, z): The expression with Go¨del number z is a direct consequence of the
expressions with Go¨del numbers x and y by modus ponens,
y = 23 ∗ x ∗ 211 ∗ z ∗ 25 ∧ Gd(x) ∧ Gd(z).
Gen(x, y): The expression with Go¨del number y comes from the expression with
Go¨del number x by the Generalization Rule,
(∃v)v<y(EVbl(v) ∧ y = 2
3 ∗ 23 ∗ 213 ∗ v ∗ 25 ∗ x ∗ 25 ∧ Gd(x)).
Ax(y): y is the Go¨del number of an axiom of PA:
LAx(y) ∨ PrAx(y).
Neg(v): the Go¨del number of (¬α) if v is the Go¨del number of α:
Neg(v) = 23 ∗ 29 ∗ v ∗ 25.
Prf(x): x is the Go¨del number of a proof in PA:
1We shall not reproduce entirely this long list of definitions which is already well-known (see
also [1] 162-176).
∃uu<x ∃vv<x ∃zz<x ∃ww<x ([x = 2
w ∧ Ax(w)]∨
[Prf(u) ∧ Fml((u)w) ∧ x = u ∗ 2
v ∧ Gen((u)w, v)]∨
[Prf(u) ∧ Fml((u)z) ∧ Fml((u)w) ∧ x = u ∗ 2
v ∧ MP((u)z, (u)w, v)]∨
[Prf(u) ∧ x = u ∗ 2v ∧ Ax(v)].
Pf(x, v): x is the Go¨del number of a proof in PA of the formula with Go¨del
number v:
Prf(x) ∧ v = (x)
lh(x)

–1
.
By means of such definitions, we shall define two new predicates, Rf and Ref.
Rf(x, v): x is the Go¨del number of a proof in PA of the negation of the formula
with Go¨del number v:
Pf(x, z) ∧ z = Neg(v).
In other terms Rf(x, v) states x is the Go¨del number of a refutation in PA of the
formula with Go¨del number v 2.
Rf is primitive recursive, as the relations obtained from primitive recursive rela-
tions by means of propositional connectives are also primitive recursive ([5] 137).
For its recursiveness Rf(x, v) is expressible in PA by a formula Rf(x, v).
Ref(x): x is the Go¨del number of a refutation in PA:
Prf(v) ∧ v = Neg(x)
In other terms Ref(x) states x is the Go¨del number of a proof in PA of its
negation. Ref(x) is primitive recursive, as the relations obtained from primitive re-
cursive relations by means of propositional connectives are also primitive recursive.
For its recursiveness Ref(x) is expressible in PA by a formula Ref(x).
Lemma 1. For any natural number n and for any formula α not both Rf(n, pαq)
and Pf(n, pαq).
Proof. Let us suppose to have both Rf(n, pαq) and Pf(n, pαq). We should have then
Prf(n)∧pαq = (n)
lh(n)

–1
and Pf(n, z)∧z = Neg(pαq), i.e. Prf(n)∧pαq = (n)
lh(n)

–1
and Prf(n) ∧ Neg(pαq) = (n)
lh(n)

–1
.
By the definition of Prf(x) this would mean to have
∃uu<n ∃vv<n ∃zz<n ∃ww<n ([n = 2
w ∧ Ax(w)]∨
[Prf(u) ∧ Fml((u)w) ∧ n = u ∗ 2
v ∧ Gen((u)w, v)]∨
[Prf(u) ∧ Fml((u)z) ∧ Fml((u)w) ∧ n = u ∗ 2
v ∧ MP((u)z , (u)w, v)]∨
[Prf(u) ∧ n = u ∗ 2v ∧ Ax(v)] and both
pαq = (n)
lh(n)

–1
and Neg(pαq) = (n)
lh(n)

–1
and hence the four cases
(1) [n = 2pαq ∧ Ax(pαq)] and
[n = 2Neg(pαq) ∧ Ax(Neg(pαq))]
(2) [Prf(u) ∧ Fml((u)w) ∧ n = u ∗ 2
pαq ∧ Gen((u)w, pαq)] and
[Prf(u) ∧ Fml((u)w) ∧ n = u ∗ 2
Neg(pαq) ∧ Gen((u)w, Neg(pαq))]
2One can easily see that Rf(x, v) is the same as
∃uu<x ∃vv<x ∃zz<x ∃ww<x ∃yy<x
([x = 2y ∧ Ax(y) ∧ y = Neg(v)]∨
[Prf(u) ∧ Fml((u)w) ∧ x = u ∗ 2y ∧ Gen((u)w , y) ∧ y = Neg(v)]∨
[Prf(u) ∧ Fml((u)z) ∧ Fml((u)w) ∧ x = u ∗ 2y ∧ MP((u)z , (u)w , y) ∧ y = Neg(v)]∨
[Prf(u) ∧ x = u ∗ 2y ∧ Ax(y) ∧ y = Neg(v)].
(3) [Prf(u) ∧ Fml((u)z) ∧ Fml((u)w) ∧ n = u ∗ 2
pαq ∧ MP((u)z, (u)w, pαq)] and
[Prf(u)∧Fml((u)z)∧Fml((u)w)∧n = u∗2
Neg(pαq)∧MP((u)z , (u)w, Neg(pαq))]
(4) [Prf(u) ∧ n = u ∗ 2pαq ∧ Ax(pαq)] and
[Prf(u) ∧ n = u ∗ 2Neg(pαq) ∧ Ax(Neg(pαq))]
which are all immediately impossible by the definitions of Ax(y), Gen(x, y) and
MP(x, y, z) and thence by the definitions of the axioms of PA, the Generalization
Rule and Modus Ponens, because no axiom belongs to PA together with its negation
and the two inference rules preserve logical validity. 
We now recall the definition of characteristic function. If R is a relation of n
arguments, then the characteristic function CR is defined as follows
CR(x1, . . . , xn) =
{
0 if R(x1, . . . , xn) is true,
1 if R(x1, . . . , xn) is false.
Let us call the characteristic functions of Pf(x, v), Prf(x), Rf(x, v) and Ref(x)
respectively CPf, CPrf, CRf, and CRef.
A relation R(x1, . . . , xn) is said to be primitive recursive (recursive) if and only
if its characteristic function CR(x1, . . . , xn) is primitive recursive (recursive) ([5]
137). As Pf(x, v), Prf(x), Rf(x, v) and Ref(x) are primitive recursive then also
CPf, CPrf, CRf and CRef are primitive recursive.
Every recursive function is representable in PA ([5] 143), thence CPf, CPrf, CRf
and CRef, are representable in PA. We shall assume CPf , CPrf , CRf and CRef to
represent respectively CPf, CPrf, CRf and CRef in PA.
Lemma 2. For any formula α, and n as the Go¨del number of a proof in PA of α
⊢PA CPf (n, pαq) = 0 ∧ CRf (n, pαq) = 1
Proof. One can easily see that the two conjuncts are true: as n is the Go¨del number
of a proof in PA of α CPf (n, pαq) = 0 is true. By Lemma (1) Rf(n, pαq) does not
hold, therefore it is true that n is not the Go¨del number of a refutation in PA of
α. 
Lemma 3. For any formula α, and n as the Go¨del number of a refutation in PA
of α
⊢PA CRf (n, pαq) = 0 ∧ CPf (n, pαq) = 1
Proof. One can easily see that the two conjuncts are true: as n is the Go¨del number
of a refutation in PA of α CRf (n, pαq) = 0 is true. By Lemma (1) Pf(n, pαq) does
not hold, therefore it is true that n is not the Go¨del number of a proof in PA of
α. 
Lemma 4. For any formula α
(i) not both
⊢PA Pf(n, pαq) ⊢PA Rf(n, pαq),
(ii) for n as the Go¨del number of a refutation in PA of α
⊢PA Rf(n, pαq)⇐⇒ ¬Pf(n, pαq),
(iii) for n as the Go¨del number of a proof in PA of α
⊢PA Pf(n, pαq)⇐⇒ ¬Rf(n, pαq).
Proof. (i) Immediately by Lemma (1) and the definition of being expressible which
holds for both Pf(x, v) and Rf(x, v) ([5] 130).
(ii) Let us assume ⊢PA Rf(n, pαq), then Lemma (3) yields ⊢PA CPf (n, pαq) = 1.
Hence by definition Pf(n, pαq) is false, consequently ⊢PA ¬Pf(n, pαq). Conversely
let us assume ⊢PA ¬Pf(n, pαq) then Pf(n, pαq) is false and by Lemma (3) we
attain ⊢PA Rf(n, pαq).
(iii) Let us assume ⊢PA Pf(n, pαq), then Lemma (2) yields ⊢PA CRf (n, pαq) =
1. Hence by definition Rf(n, pαq) is false, consequently ⊢PA ¬Rf(n, pαq). Con-
versely let us assume ⊢PA ¬Rf(n, pαq) then Rf(n, pαq) is false and by Lemma (2)
we attain ⊢PA Pf(n, pαq). 
All preceding lemmas were carried out constructively, needlessly to assume con-
sistency. We are now able to consider the consequences yielded by such lemmas to
the Go¨del’s argumentation.
(a′) Assume ⊢PA δ. Let r be the Go¨del number of a proof in PA of δ. Then
Pf(r, q). Hence, ⊢PA Pf(r, q), that is ⊢PA Pf(r, pδq). Hence by Lemma (4)
(i) ⊢PA Rf(r, pδq) is not admitted, which means that r cannot be the Go¨del
number of a refutation of δ (indeed Lemma (2) yields ⊢PA CRf (r, pδq) = 1).
Even though we can have ⊢PA ¬Rf(r, pδq), by (iii) of Lemma (4), then we
shall have not ⊢PA ¬Pf(r, pδq) by Lemma (2) (⊢PA CPf (r, pδq) = 0).
(b′) Assume ⊢PA ¬δ. Let r be the Go¨del number of a proof in PA of ¬δ. Then
Rf(r, q). Hence ⊢PA Rf(r, q) that is ⊢PA Rf(r, pδq). Hence by Lemma
(4) (i) ⊢PA Pf(r, pδq) is not admitted. This means that r cannot be the
Go¨del number of a proof of δ (in fact, r is the Go¨del number of a refutation
of δ, Lemma (3) yields ⊢PA CPf (r, pδq) = 1). Even though we can have
⊢PA ¬Pf(r, pδq), by (ii) of Lemma (4) as well, then we shall have not
⊢PA ¬Rf(r, pδq) by Lemma (3) (⊢PA CRf (r, pδq) = 0).
We have thus shown that previous Lemmas prevent any accomplishment of (a)
and (b) within Go¨del’s argumentation 3. We have then established the following
theorem.
Theorem 5. By the arithmetization of the refutability predicate Go¨del’s incom-
pleteness does not hold as a theorem of PA.
2. Consistency, Completeness and Decidability
A recursive predicate defines a decidable set, by reason that its characteristic
function is considered to be effectively computable ([5] 165, 249).
Let us call TPA the set of Go¨del numbers of theorems of PA and RPA the set of
Go¨del numbers of refutations of PA.
By the recursiveness of Pf(x, v), CPf(x, v) = 0 if v ∈ TPA and CPf(x, v) = 1 if
v /∈ TPA. By the recursiveness of Rf(x, v), CRf(x, v) = 0 if v ∈ RPA and CRf(x, v) =
1 if v /∈ RPA.
We can than state the following theorem.
Theorem 6. TPA and RPA are decidable sets.
3As regard to (b), we notice that in (b′), by Lemma (1), ⊢PA Pf(r,pδq) is not admitted for
every natural number r such that Rf(r, q) (i.e. whenever ⊢PA ¬δ).
It is furthermore well-known that if we have a computable function f(x1, . . . , xn)
such that
f(x1, . . . , xn) =
{
0 if < x1, . . . , xn >∈ S
1 if < x1, . . . , xn >/∈ S
(where S is a set of natural number which turns out to be decidable just by this
definition), then the function g(x1, . . . , xn) defined by
g(x1, . . . , xn) =
{
1 if f(x1, . . . , xn) = 0
0 if f(x1, . . . , xn) = 1
is effectively computable too. Accordingly the complement of S is decidable. One
can easily see that for f(x1, . . . , xn) primitive recursive, g(x1, . . . , xn) is primitive
recursive too. Consequently we have
C¬Prf(x) =
{
1 if CPrf(x) = 0
0 if CPrf(x) = 1
C¬Ref(x) =
{
1 if CRef(x) = 0
0 if CRef(x) = 1
C¬Pf(x, v) =
{
1 if CPf(x, v) = 0
0 if CPf(x, v) = 1
C¬Rf(x, v) =
{
1 if CRf(x, v) = 0
0 if CRf(x, v) = 1
where ¬Prf, ¬Pf, ¬Ref and ¬Rf are respectively complementary of Prf, Pf, Ref
and Rf.
Let us summarize, Prf, Pf, Ref and Rf are primitive recursive, then CPrf, CPf,
CRef and CRf are primitive recursive too. But C¬Prf(x) = 1−CPrf(x), C¬Pf(x, v) =
1−CPrf(x, v), C¬Ref(x) = 1−CRef(x), and C¬Rf(x, v) = 1−CRf(x, v), thence ¬Prf,
¬Pf, ¬Ref and ¬Rf are primitive recursive too.
We have then the following statements.
Lemma 7. For every x
Prf(x) if and only if ¬Ref(x).
Proof. Let us assume Prf(x). CPrf(x) = 0. Hence CPrf(Neg(x)) = 1, by the effective
computability of CPrf. Prf(Neg(x)) is false, then Ref(x) is false. Accordingly,
CRef(x) = 1. Thus C¬Ref(x) = 0 and ¬Ref(x).
Conversely, let us assume ¬Ref(x). Then C¬Ref(x) = 0 and CRef(x) = 1. If
Ref(x) is false by its definition Prf(Neg(x)) is false. Thus CPrf(Neg(x)) = 1 and
C¬Prf(Neg(x)) = 0. Consequently C¬Prf(x) = 1, and CPrf(x) = 0. Hence Prf(x).

If we convent to formalize “a proof in PA of θ” with θ1 . . . θr ⊢PA θ then we have
⊢PA (θ1 ⇒ (θ2 ⇒ . . . (θr ⇒ θ) . . . )) (Herbrand, 1930). Indeed Lemma (7) could
be read as follows: for θ1, . . . , θr, θ formulas in PA Prf(p(θ1 ⇒ (θ2 ⇒ . . . (θr ⇒
θ) . . . ))q) if and only if ¬Ref(p(θ1 ⇒ (θ2 ⇒ . . . (θr ⇒ θ) . . . ))q).
Furthermore, by the recursiveness of Prf(x), CPrf(x) = 0 if x ∈ TPA and
CPrf(x) = 1 if x /∈ TPA. By the recursiveness of Ref(x) CRef(x) = 0 if x ∈ RPA and
CRef(x) = 1 if x /∈ RPA.
Lemma 8. For every < x, v >
Pf(x, v) if and only if ¬Rf(x, v).
Proof. Let us assume Pf(x, v). CPf(x, v) = 0. Hence CPf(x, Neg(v)) = 1. Accord-
ingly C¬Pf(x, Neg(v)) = 0. Thence C¬Rf(x, v) = 0 and ¬Rf(x, v). Conversely, let us
assume ¬Rf(x, v). We have then ¬Pf(x, Neg(v)) and C¬Pf(x, Neg(v)) = 0. Therefore
C¬Pf(x, v) = 1, by the effective computability of C¬Pf. Accordingly CPf(x, v) = 0
and Pf(x, v). 
Indeed Lemma (8) could be read as follows: for θ1, . . . , θr, α formulas in PA
Pf(p(θ1 ⇒ (θ2 ⇒ . . . (θr ⇒ α) . . . )q, pαq) if and only if ¬Rf(p(θ1 ⇒ (θ2 ⇒ . . . (θr ⇒
α) . . . )q, pαq).
Lemma 9. For m = pαq and n = p(θ1 ⇒ (θ2 ⇒ . . . (θr ⇒ θ) . . . ))q
(i) m ∈ TPA iff m /∈ RPA,
(ii) n ∈ TPA iff n /∈ RPA.
Proof. Immediately (i) by Lemma (8), (ii) by Lemma(7). 
Theorem 10. PA is consistent; that is, there is no formula α such that both α and
¬α are theorems of PA.
Proof. Let us assume m to be the Go¨del number of a proof of a formula α of PA
and n to be the Go¨del number of a proof of ¬α. Then n,m ∈ TPA. But since n is
the Go¨del number of a proof of ¬α we have also n ∈ RPA, accordingly n belongs
to both TPA and RPA, which is impossible by Lemma (9). 
Theorem 11. PA is complete; that is for any well formed formula α of PA either
⊢PA α or ⊢PA ¬α.
Proof. Let α be a well formed formula of PA, we can then yield by Go¨del numbering
m = pαq. By Lemma (9) either m ∈ TPA or m ∈ RPA. Therefore either ⊢PA α or
⊢PA ¬α. 
Let us call PF the full first-order predicate calculus ([5] 172). Let TPF be then
the set of Go¨del number of theorems of PF.
Theorem 12. TPF is decidable.
Proof. By Go¨del Completeness Theorem, a formula α of PA is provable in PA if
and only if α is logically valid, and α is provable in PF if and only if α is logically
valid. Hence ⊢PA α if and only if ⊢PF α. Accordingly, for n as the Go¨del number
of a proof of α in PA,
n ∈ TPA iff n ∈ TPF .
Hence, by theorem (6), TPF is decidable. 
Calling our attention to the diagonalization lemma we note that it holds for any
formula φ with only the variable v free. In other terms φ can be replaced by any
formula with only one free variable. Let us suppose now that a sentence δ is a
theorem of PA, i.e. ⊢PA δ. For n as the Go¨del number of a proof in PA of δ we
have ⊢PA Pf(n, pδq). But for φ(v) as ∀xRf(x, v) diagonalization lemma could
have already yielded ⊢PA δ ⇐⇒ ∀xRf(x, pδq) then by biconditional elimination
we have ⊢PA ∀xRf(x, pδq). Hence, by Particularization Rule, ⊢PA Rf(n, pδq), and
therefore
⊢PA Pf(n, pδq) ∧Rf(n, pδq),
which is false by reason of Go¨del numbering itself, as proved by Lemma (1) which
holds for each natural number n. By the tautology (A ∧ B) ⇒ (A ⇐⇒ B) we
should then have ⊢PA Pf(n, pδq) ⇐⇒ Rf(n, pδq), which openly conflicts with
(iii) in Lemma (4). Finally, by lemma (8) it is always the case that for whatever
formula δ and n = p(θ1 ⇒ (θ2 ⇒ . . . (θr ⇒ δ) . . . )q
⊢PA Pf(n, pδq) ⇐⇒ ¬Rf(n, pδq).
We have thus established that the applicability of the diagonalization lemma to
any formula φ with only the variable v free leads to the assertion of a contradiction
as a theorem of PA and for this reason PA turns out to be inconsistent. Conse-
quently diagonalization can no longer be considered to hold as an equivalence nor
replacement theorem. We shall have accordingly the following theorem.
Theorem 13. Diagonalization does not hold as a lemma in PA.

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